We provide a general theorem implying that for a (strongly) dependent theory T the theory of sufficiently well-behaved pairs of models of T is again (strongly) dependent. We apply the theorem to the case of lovely pairs of thorn-rank one theories as well as to a setting of dense pairs of first-order topological theories.

We develop a new notion of independence (þ-independence, read "thorn"-independence) that arises from a family of ranks suggested by Scanlon (þ-ranks). We prove that in a large class of theories (including simple theories and o-minimal theories) this notion has many of the properties needed for an adequate geometric structure. We prove that þ-independence agrees with the usual independence notions in stable, supersimple and o-minimal theories. Furthermore, we give some evidence that the equivalence between forking and þ-forking in simple theories might (...) be closely related to one of the main open conjectures in simplicity theory, the stable forking conjecture. In particular, we prove that in any simple theory where the stable forking conjecture holds. þ-independence and forking independence agree. (shrink)

O-minimal structures have long been thought to occupy the base of a hierarchy of ordered structures, in analogy with the role that strongly minimal structures play with respect to stable theories. This is the first in an anticipated series of papers whose aim is the development of model theory for ordered structures of rank greater than one. A class of ordered structures to which a notion of finite rank can be assigned, the decomposable structures, is introduced here. These include all (...) ordered structures definable in o-minimal structures. The principal result in this paper, Theorem 5.1, asserts roughly that a decomposable structure [Formula: see text] can be partitioned into finitely many definable subsets such that on each set the restriction of < is a "twisted lexicographic" order. As a consequence, for all n and linear orders ≺ definable on a subset X ⊆ Mn in an o-minimal structure [Formula: see text], there is a definable partition of X such that the restriction of ≺ to each set in the partition is "lexicographic". (shrink)

We study dp-minimal and strongly dependent theories and investigate connections between these notions and weight.

We develop the theory of domination by stable types and stable weight in an arbitrary theory.

Let M be an arbitrary structure. Then we say that an M -formula φ defines a stable set inM if every formula φ ∧ α is stable. We prove: If G is an M -definable group and every definable stable subset of G has U -rank at most n , then G has a maximal connected stable normal subgroup H such that G /H is purely unstable. The assumptions hold for example if M is interpretable in an o-minimal structure.More generally, (...) an M -definable set X is weakly stable if the M -induced structure on X is stable. We observe that, by results of Shelah, every weakly stable set in theories with NIP is stable. (shrink)

We examine several conditions, either the existence of a rank or a particular property of þ-forking that suggest the existence of a well-behaved independence relation, and determine the consequences of each of these conditions towards the rosiness of the theory. In particular we show that the existence of an ordinal valued equivalence relation rank is a (necessary and) sufficient condition for rosiness.

This paper is devoted to understand groups definable in Presburger Arithmetic. We prove the following theorems: Theorem 1. Every group definable in a model of Presburger Arithmetic is abelian-by-finite. Theorem 2. Every bounded abelian group definable in a model of (Z, +, <) Presburger Arithmetic is definably isomorphic to (Z, +)^n mod out by a lattice.

We study the behaviour of stable types in rosy theories. The main technical result is that a non-þ-forking extension of an unstable type is unstable. We apply this to show that a rosy group with a þ-generic stable type is stable. In the context of super-rosy theories of finite rank we conclude that non-trivial stable types of U þ -rank 1 must arise from definable stable sets.

In this paper, we prove the following:Theorem. Let M be a rosy dependent theory and letp,pbe non-þ-forking extensions ofp∈Switha0a1; assume thatp∪pis consistent and thata0,a1start a þ-independent indiscernible sequence. Thenp∪pis a non-þ-forking extension ofp.We also provide an example to show that the result is not true without assuming NIP.

We prove an analogue of the fixed-point theorem for the case of definably amenable groups.

Ross, Alf Loar, Brian, Editor.Directives and Norms. New York: Humanities Press, [1967]. ix, 188 pp. Reprint available April 2009 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN-13: 978-1-58477-961-2. ISBN-10: 1-58477-961-6. Cloth with dust jacket. $65.00 * Reprint of the first American edition. One of the most interesting jurists of the post-World War II era, Ross [1899-1979] was a legal and moral philosopher, scholar of international law and the leading representative of Scandinavian Legal Realism. This book and On Law and Justice (1958) are (...) his principal works. In Directives and Norms Ross asks whether imperatives (or, to use his term, 'directives') are subject to logic in the same way as indicatives. He shows the difference between indicative and directive discourse and explains the concepts 'directive' and 'norm' as they function in the social sciences, especially in the study of law. A contemporary essay in the Modern Law Review (32:544), though critical of this work, was still impressed by its "clear and convincing account" of these processes. (shrink)

This article applies some conceptual tools from semiotics to better understand the disastrous impacts of the world economy on global ecology. It traces the accelerating production of material disorder and waste to the logic of the money sign, as economic production processes simultaneously increase exchange-values and entropy. The exchange of indexical and iconic signs is essential to the dynamics of ecological systems and the proliferation of biological diversity. The human species has added a third kind of sign, the symbol, and (...) more recently a fourth: all-purpose money. Money does not refer to any referent either through contiguity, similarity, or convention. It is an empty sign, capable of assuming any significance that its owner attributes to it. The article argues that the concept of symbolic reference should be restricted to cultural and linguistic phenomena. Money qualifies as a new species of sign based on its exceedingly open mode of reference. It does not refer to any object by social convention but owes its specific properties precisely to the absence of such conventions. The logic of money pivots on decontextualisation: it presupposes and encourages the detachment of exchange values, people, and concepts from the particular and the local. Selective advantage is no longer primarily about calibration within local contexts, but increasingly a matter of transcending or emancipating oneself from the specific. This drift toward decontextualisation reverses the evolution of complexity and diversity throughout the planetary biosphere. (shrink)

Reprint of the first American edition. One of the most interesting jurists of the post-World War II era, Ross [1899-1979] was a legal and moral philosopher, scholar of international law and the leading representative of Scandinavian Legal Realism. This book and On Law and Justice (1958) are his principal works. In Directives and Norms Ross asks whether imperatives (or, to use his term, 'directives') are subject to logic in the same way as indicatives. He shows the difference between indicative and (...) directive discourse and explains the concepts 'directive' and 'norm' as they function in the social sciences, especially in the study of law. A contemporary essay in the Modern Law Review (32:544), though critical of this work, was still impressed by its "clear and convincing account" of these processes. (shrink)

We prove that for every Scott set S there are S-saturated real closed fields and S-saturated models of Presburger arithmetic.

Though media ethics has emerged as a strong topic in recent years, the discussion may be of little value in helping improve ethical performance of the media until owner ethics becomes a major topic. This case study explores the conflict of interest problem for owners lobbying for special interest legislation and eroding independence of newsrooms.

Ross, Alf. On Law and Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959. xi, 383 pp. Reprint available December 2004 by the Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

One of the main obstacles for panpsychism, the view that consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous, is the difficulty of explaining how simple subjects could combine to form complex subjects. Known as the subject combination problem, it poses a possibly insurmountable challenge to the view. In this paper, I will assume that this challenge cannot be overcome and instead present a version of panpsychism that completely avoids talk of combination. Inspired by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s metaphysics of monads, I will focus on (...) a relational explanation of how simple subjects could constitute complex experiences, without them having to combine in virtue of their subjectivity. I call this view _monadic panpsychism_. Additionally, my proposal will not rely on emergence and so it will circumvent problems commonly faced by emergentist accounts. As I will argue, monadic panpsychism is preferable to combinatory and emergentist panpsychism because it faces a significantly less worrisome set of objections. Apart from being unaffected by the seemingly insuperable issue of subject combination, I will demonstrate that monadic panpsychism also has tools to address other kinds of the combination problem. That alone justifies the need for a new formulation of panpsychism, one which faces unique difficulties but also offers unique solutions. (shrink)

Abstract:The prevailing anti-authorial trend in contemporary mainstream literary theory and aesthetic anti-intentionalism produces different versions of "the death of the author" concept. Conversely, different forms of intentionalism in the analytic tradition strongly defend the relevance of authorial intentions. Although I agree with classic intentionalism on some key points, I find it untenable to believe that the meaning of a literary work is wholly dependent on the intentions of its creator. Rather I consider authorial meaning as one variety of literary meaning. (...) My explanation of the part the author plays in literary understanding is consistent with Anders Pettersson's theory. (shrink)

The existing literature treats of several investigations with a certain bearing on the question which is roughly indicated by the title “Imperatives and Logic.” Some of those investigations, however, are entirely outside the scope of the present work.Mally sets himself the task of developing a “Logik des Willens” constituting a parallel to the usual logic, the “Logik des Denkens". In order to emphasize its independence, the author also calls this “Logik des Willens” “Deontik”, and he conceives it as being based (...) on the “Wesensgesetze” of will in the same way as the usual logic is conceived as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of thought. The author develops a formalistic deductive system on the basis of 5 axioms of demands, including the axiom that there is at least one fact which is unconditionally demanded, and through a lengthy series of theorems he arrives at the sentence that what is unconditionally demanded is identical with what is actually the case: “was sein soll, ist Tatsache”. Similarly, the author develops a system of axioms for “right” volition, including the axiom that right volition is non-contradictory. (shrink)

Theories of well-being that I call “loving-the-good” claim that one intrinsically benefits if and only if one loves what is objectively good. For these views, well-being comes to be when the correct connection between world and mind obtains. Intuitively, ill-being is the opposite of well-being. I explore the resources of loving-the-good views to explain ill-being, especially whether they can do so and also meet the theoretical virtues of continuity and unity. Continuity is met when ill-being theory mirrors the well-being theory. (...) Unity is met when all instances of a phenomenon are given the same kind of explanation. I argue that, strikingly, the key insight of loving-the-good theories of well-being does not seem plausible for ill-being. A consequence is that loving-the-good theories face significant problems to meet continuity. I examine alternatives for these views to meet unity. I argue that plausible explanations of ill-being do not meet unity either. (shrink)

The essays in this volume concern the topic of legal rights, how they are related to morality, the place of rights on moral theory, and the legal recognition of rights.

This essay proposes that management is too often seen as problem solving, and that the equally important art of ignoring problems has not received enough attention. With reference to the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the essay argues for letting go, and attempting to leave thoughts at rest.

Most of us spend a significant portion of our lives learning, practising, and performing a wide range of skills. Many of us also have a great amount of control over which skills we learn and develop. From choices as significant as career pursuits to those as minor as how we spend our weeknight leisure time, we exercise a great amount of agency over what we know and what we can do. In this paper we argue, using a framework first developed (...) by Carbonell (2013) that in many real-world circumstances we have moral obligations to develop some skills rather than others. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for Fit, a prudential version of the claim that attitudes must fit their objects, the claim that there is an extra benefit when one's reactions fit their objects. I argue that Fit has surprising and powerful consequences for theories of well-being. Classic versions of the objective list theory, hedonism, desire views, and loving-the-good theories do not accommodate Fit. Suitable modifications change some of the views substantially. Modified views give reactions a robust role as sources of (...) well-being, and they accept that objects call for some attitudes but not others. I argue that objective list theories and loving-the-good theories require the most minimal changes to accommodate Fit, so we have a pro tanto reason to favor these views over alternatives. (shrink)